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a b s t r a c t 
Using data from a stated preferences experiment in the Netherlands, we ﬁnd that replac- 
ing full-time pension schemes with schemes that offer gradual retirement opportunities 
induce workers to retire one year later on average. Total lifetime labour supply, however, 
decreases by 3.4 months, because the positive effect of delayed retirement on labour sup- 
ply is cancelled out by a reduction in working hours in the years before full retirement. 
The impact of gradual retirement schemes is, however, heterogeneous across groups of 
workers. Workers in bad health who gain access to gradual retirement postpone their re- 
tirement by 1.7 months more than workers in good health. This suggests that introduction 
of gradual retirement alleviates, to a certain extent, the health-related burden that employ- 
ees in poor health may experience in carrying out their work. Nevertheless, introduction 
of gradual retirement reduces the total labour supply of both groups of workers. Finan- 
cial incentives, either in terms of changing pension income or the price of leisure, also 
affect expected retirement age, but the impact of these ﬁnancial incentives does not differ 
with the possibility of gradual retirement. Finally, we ﬁnd that gradual retirement is not a 
preferred option among workers, as the large majority prefers full retirement. 
© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
As a result of population ageing and declining fertility, many industrialised countries with ‘pay-as-you-go’ pension sys-
tems face a steady decrease in the ratio of contributing workers to inactive retirees who draw from these schemes. These
underfunded systems will become ﬁnancially unsustainable unless either the labour supply of older workers or produc-
tivity increases rapidly enough to compensate for the negative demographics. Most industrialised countries have therefore
begun to implement major pension reforms aimed at increasing the labour supply of older workers to decrease the old-
age dependency ratio. These reforms include, among others, decreases in the generosity of pension beneﬁts and increases
in the eligibility age for early and statutory retirement ( Gruber and Wise, 1998; Duval, 2005; Mastrobuoni, 2009; Hanel,
2010; Kangas et al., 2010; Börsch-Supan, 2012; Staubli and Zweimüller, 2013 ). In addition, in several countries, gradual re-∗ Corresponding author at: ROA / Maastricht University, PO-box 616, Tongersestraat 53, MD 6200, Maastricht, The Netherlands. 
E-mail address: r.montizaan@maastrichtuniversity.nl (R. Montizaan). 
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 tirement schemes have been introduced, whereby workers do not end their career abruptly but rather in a stepwise fashion
( Reday-Mulvey, 20 0 0; Hutchens, 2010; Warren, 2015 ). 1 
Existing literature stresses that introduction of gradual retirement schemes can have major beneﬁts both at the micro and
macro levels ( Kantarci and Van Soest 2008 ). At the micro level, gradual retirement schemes could improve lifetime utility,
as they introduce the possibility of avoiding a pension shock following an abrupt transition from full-time work to full-
time retirement, and extend the choice set for older workers ( Reday-Mulvey and Delsen 1996; Reday-Mulvey 20 0 0 ). Gradual
retirement could reduce the burden of work, and thereby reduce work-related stress and increase employee morale, enabling
workers to keep working beyond an age at which they would otherwise have fully retired ( Kantarci and Van Soest 2008 ). 2 
At the macro level, gradual retirement schemes may increase actual retirement age by facilitating work after the effective
retirement age, thereby restraining early withdrawal from the labour market, provided that introduction of such schemes is
accompanied by a pension structure with the right ﬁnancial incentives. This would enhance the ﬁnancial sustainability of
current pension schemes. Gradual retirement could, however, also lead to a reduction in total labour supply when workers
engage in early part-time retirement, where they would otherwise have chosen to continue to work on a full-time basis.
The total effect on labour supply, and thus the sustainability of pension systems, therefore depends on which of these two
effects is lar ger, making the net effect of the introduction of gradual retirement schemes on total labour supply ambiguous.
This raises the question to what extent introduction of gradual retirement opportunities actually stimulates workers to
continue working, and to what extent it can be expected to increase their total labour supply. Another question is whether
the effects differ with the ﬁnancial incentives provided by the pension system to postpone retirement, the burden of work,
and workers’ health. 
This paper uses a stated preference approach to study the impact of a gradual retirement scheme on expected retirement
age and total labour supply of Dutch public sector workers. We further investigate whether the effects differ with the
ﬁnancial incentives provided by the pension system, and explore heterogeneity in the impact of the introduction of gradual
retirement opportunities on retirement preferences of workers with different personal and job characteristics. Our stated
preference approach consists of six vignettes in which respondents get hypothetical (but realistic) retirement scenarios that
either involve gradual or full retirement and that vary in terms of ﬁnancial incentives (either in terms of changing the price
of leisure or in terms of changing pension income). Respondents are asked to indicate at what age they would retire, and
are subsequently asked to compare and rank the preferred choices they made when confronted with the different scenarios.
The main reason we use a stated rather than revealed preferences approach is that we want to estimate preferences for
pension plans which do not yet exist or to which many workers so far do not have access. Previous empirical studies that
focused on actual retirement decisions suggest that introduction of gradual retirement schemes may lead to postponement
of retirement and are inconclusive about the impact on labour supply (e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier 20 04; Gielen 20 09;
Machado and Portela 2012 ). Since these studies focused on actual retirement decisions, however, they did not identify all
retirement options available to older workers, because the options that are not chosen cannot be observed, or because it is
not clear which options workers would have chosen if they had the opportunity to choose ( Kantarci and Van Soest 2008,
2013 ). The latter point is particularly relevant for studies on the impact of gradual retirement plans, since it is often unclear
whether employers offer such plans, and if they do, which trajectory of earnings and pension incomes the plan includes. This
is because gradual retirement arrangements are often based on informal agreements negotiated between an employee and
the employer ( Hutchens 2010 ). Moreover, it can be the case that employers who offer gradual retirement plans have other
barriers that prevent workers from participating in these plans. Employers are often reluctant to promote gradual retirement
due to higher ﬁxed costs involved with part-time work, the adaptation to teamwork because of sharing of jobs and the risks
of losing job-related skills caused by the reduction of working time ( Hurd 1996 ). The use of revealed preferences therefore
likely leads to an underestimation of the true labour supply effect of introducing gradual retirement. Our stated preferences
approach circumvents this type of problem. 
A further advantage of our stated preferences approach is that the included vignettes ensure that the choice alterna-
tives are known to the researcher, and that the variation in choices is suﬃciently large and, by construction, exogenous
to preferences and actual pension entitlements. Because of this exogenous variation, the estimated effects are likely to be
causal. This is also the reason why vignette studies are widely used in marketing research (e.g., Louviere et al., 20 0 0 ), and
transportation and environmental science ( Hensher 1997 ). Vignette studies are also rapidly gaining ground in economics
(see, e.g., Barsky et al. 1997; Revelt and Train 1998; Van Soest et al. 2007; Kantarci and Van Soest 2008; Braga et al., 2009;
Benjamin et al., 2014; Van Soest and Vonkova 2014 ). Several studies have systematically examined the extent to which the1 Gradual retirement schemes were ﬁrst adopted over the past two decades in combination with early retirement programs, and were only later intro- 
duced as an alternative instrument to reduce early withdrawal from the labour market. Sweden was one of the ﬁrst to adopt a gradual scheme in 1976. In 
Denmark, a reform in 1987 aimed to promote gradual retirement by replacing the system of full early retirement with a part-time work regime. In Finland, 
a partial retirement scheme was introduced for wage earners aged 60 or older in the late 1980s. This was extended in the 1990s to workers aged 56 or 
older and was further stimulated by additional incentives (e.g., tax cuts for ﬁrms). Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands now also offer 
the option to enter gradual or partial retirement before or after the standard retirement age. Outside Europe, gradual retirement schemes have also been 
introduced. For example, the Australian government stimulated gradual retirement transitions by introducing ‘transition to retirement’ pensions in 2005, 
which allow older workers to reduce their working hours and access part of their superannuation savings in the form of a pension to supplement their 
labour income ( Warren, 2015 ). 
2 Allen et al. (2003) show that, for tenured faculty at the University of North Carolina, the odds of entering phased retirement are indeed strongly and 
inversely related to employee performance. 
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 hypothetical behaviour reported in vignette studies compares to actual behaviour and present convincing evidence that is
supportive of the validity of the data generated through the use of vignettes ( Peabody et al., 20 0 0, 20 04; Eiﬂer 20 07; Telser
and Zweifel 2007 ). 
We ﬁnd that replacement of full-time retirement schemes with a gradual retirement scheme stimulates workers to retire
full-time, on average, one year later. Nevertheless, labour supply signiﬁcantly decreases by 3.4 months when workers have
the gradual retirement option, as the positive effect of delayed retirement on labour supply is more than cancelled out by
the reduction in working hours in the years preceding full retirement. This is due to the relatively long period that workers
make use of gradual retirement schemes in which they work only half the time they would have worked if they had only the
full-time retirement option. Gradual retirement thus has an asymmetric effect on the timing of various retirement stages by
inducing an earlier start to the retirement process and not postponing full-time retirement enough to generate an offsetting
effect on hours worked. The impact of the introduction of gradual retirement schemes is, however, heterogeneous across
groups of workers. Workers in bad health who gain access to gradual retirement postpone their full-time retirement by
1.7 months more than employees in good health. Nevertheless, the introduction of gradual retirement reduces the total
labour supply of both groups of workers. We further show that the positive impact of ﬁnancial incentives to postpone
retirement on workers’ retirement expectations does not differ between gradual- and full-retirement options. Finally, our
ranking analysis of workers’ preference for the different scenarios shows that gradual retirement is not a preferred option
among workers, as the large majority still prefers full retirement. Our results therefore suggest that introduction of gradual
retirement opportunities in the Netherlands would not contribute to an increase in aggregate labour supply of workers
close to retirement. We expect that these results are of particular interest to other Northern European countries which
have similar pension systems. It should be noted, however, that we identify only the partial effect on the labour supply of
workers close to retirement and do not claim that the decrease in labour supply due to gradual retirement would result in
a reduction of total employment in the economy. 
This study contributes to the literature on gradual retirement and labour supply of older workers in three ways. First,
the correlation between gradual retirement opportunities and total labour supply is investigated by only a handful of em-
pirical studies, which provide mixed results. While Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) found that abolishing minimum-hour
constraints is associated with a small net increase in full-time equivalent employment, Gielen (2009) and Machado and
Portela (2012) and Graf et al. (2011) found explorative suggestive evidence that labour supply of older workers is negatively
associated with ﬂexibility in work hours. 
Second, this paper builds on two related studies by Van Soest et al. (2007) and Kantarci and Van Soest (2013) . These
studies, also using stated preferences experiments, show that many workers can be enticed to work part-time if they are
given fair ﬁnancial compensation, but also that many workers are more likely to choose full-time retirement over partial re-
tirement. 3 Our study differs from these studies in several ways. Most importantly, we do not limit ourselves by studying only
the impact of gradual retirement on retirement expectations, but focus particularly on its net impact on the expected total
labour supply of workers who have the option of gradual retirement. In particular, for the oldest workers in our estimation
sample, who are close to retirement, we might expect that these expected labour supply effects will translate into actual
labour supply effects. 4 A further advantage of our study is that the base scheme in our stated preference experiment is simi-
lar to the actual pension scheme of public sector workers in the Netherlands. While Van Soest et al. (2007) and Kantarci and
Van Soest (2013) used highly stylized regimes that are not related to actual pension schemes in the Netherlands and do not
allow for different durations of gradual retirement in their scenarios, our vignette regimes provide many more choice op-
tions, allowing for more realistic estimates of the effects of gradual retirement opportunities on the labour supply. Finally,
we go beyond previous studies by showing that introduction of gradual retirement schemes in the Netherlands may have
heterogeneous effects on the retirement age and labour supply of workers with health problems and physically demanding
jobs. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Dutch pension system. Section 3 describes the data, experimental
design, and variables used in the analyses. Section 4 presents the main analyses. Finally, Section 5 summarises our ﬁndings
and sets forth our conclusions. 
2. Dutch retirement system 
2.1. Pillars of the Dutch retirement system 
Although our stated preference experiment used vignettes in which individuals were confronted with hypothetical pen-
sion schemes unrelated to their actual pension scheme, it is important to have a good overview of the Dutch retirement
system. To what extent are the hypothetical pension schemes realistic to the respondents? 
The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars (see De Grip et al. (2012; A. 2013) for more information). The ﬁrst
consists of a ﬂat-rate public scheme (AOW) to which all citizens are entitled, regardless of whether they are employee,3 Stated preference experiments have also been used in retirement studies which did not focus on gradual retirement (e.g., Van Soest and Vonkova, 
2014 ). 
4 Wadensjö (2006) showed descriptive evidence that introduction of a popular part-time pension scheme in Sweden was associated with an increase in 
the number of hours worked in Sweden, especially among women. 
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 self-employed, or never participated in the labour market. The AOW provides Dutch citizens with a pension beneﬁt that
guarantees 70% of the net minimum wage for a single household and 50% for each partner in a couple (either married or
oﬃcially living together). For decades, the eligibility age for the AOW was 65. Due to recent reforms in 2013 and 2015, the
eligibility age for the AOW is gradually increasing to 66 years in 2018 and 67 in 2021. After 2021, the eligibility age will be
linked to life expectancy in the Netherlands. If life expectancy increases further, so will the eligibility age for the AOW. Ques-
tions are raised in the ongoing discussion between social partners within the Netherlands as to whether further increases
in the retirement age might have negative consequences especially for workers in heavy occupations. As a consequence, a
recent proposal introduces a more ﬂexible eligibility age for the AOW, including options for part-time retirement. 5 
The second pillar consists of supplementary earnings-related pensions. This is a deﬁned-beneﬁt type of pension for em-
ployees organized at the sector or ﬁrm level and is fully funded. Sector pensions are negotiated between unions and em-
ployer organizations at the sector or ﬁrm level and are in most cases set forth in collective agreements. Participation is
mandatory, ensuring that each worker is covered by sector pensions. The Pensions and Savings Act ( Pensioen en Spaarfond-
senwet ) until 2007 and the Pensions Act from 2007 onwards ( Pensioenwet ) dictate that the administration of the sector
pension schemes in the second pillar is delegated to pension funds to which both employers and employees have to con-
tribute. Pension beneﬁts in the second pillar are based on the average wage workers have built up over their entire career.
These average wage schemes have by now almost totally replaced the ﬁnal salary schemes, based on employees’ last wage.
The second pillar pension can be used to retire early or late, before or after the eligibility age for the state pension. 6 The
earliest age people can claim second pillar pension beneﬁts is 60 years, while the latest age is 70 years. Replacement rates
depend on the age at retirement. Early retirement leads to lower beneﬁts. 
The third pillar includes all voluntarily built-up savings that are in addition to the ﬁrst two pillars. Due to the well-
established ﬁrst two pillars of the Dutch pension system, the third pillar is less developed in the Netherlands than in other
countries. The ﬁrst two pillars combined already generate pension replacement rates that are amongst the most generous
in the world ( OECD 2017 ). 7 
In 2015, the ﬁrst two pillars yielded a gross replacement rate of about 69% (of the average wage) when a typical worker in
the public sector retired full-time at age 64. This worker experienced an accrual rate of approximately 5% for each year he or
she retires earlier (people can retire from 60 years onwards) or later (until age 70). This implies that the gross replacement
rate would be about 65% when retiring at age 63, approximately 80% when retiring at age 66 (the new eligibility age for
the AOW in 2018), and approximately 99% when retiring at age 70. 8 
2.2. Part-time retirement options in the Netherlands 
Employees in the Netherlands have the option to retire part-time with an actuarially fair impact on their pension beneﬁts.
Part-time pension beneﬁts are part of the second pillar of the Dutch pension system. Employees have the opportunity to
decide together with their employer how much they reduce their working hours. Part-time pensions are, however, only
possible in steps of at least 10% of full-time work. On average, Dutch employees who retire part-time reduce their working
hours by 50% (ROA Public Sector Survey 2014). When employees in the Netherlands decide to retire part-time, they receive
a salary for the days worked and pension beneﬁts for the rest of the full-time working week. Thus, they still build up
pension rights for the part of the week they work. Because workers draw from their pension and due to the fact that they
contribute over a smaller salary, their pensions will be lower than those of workers who continued working full-time. A
part-time pension is only possible from age 60 until ﬁve years after workers reach pensionable age (which was 65 at the
moment when our experiment was conducted). 
3. Data and experimental design 
3.1. Data collection 
The Dutch public sector’s pension fund provided us with 7520 randomly selected e-mail addresses of Dutch public sector
employees born between 1952 and 1975. In the ﬁrst week of April 2015, we sent an e-mail to these employees containing
the link to a web-based survey (the ROA Public Sector Survey 2015) with questions on individual and job characteristics,
alternative sources of income after retirement, and partner characteristics. Moreover, the survey included the stated prefer-
ences experiment we use to investigate workers’ ﬁnal age of retirement and labour supply until retirement under full-time5 https://www.fnv.nl/site/nieuws/webassistent/HarrieLindelauff/fnvplan- ﬂexibele- aow- voor- eerlijk- stoppen- met- werken/10puntenplanﬂexibeleaow.pdf . 
6 Although compensation for inﬂation is the default for supplementary earnings-related pensions, it has not been given in the last few years, due to the 
rising ratio between liabilities and assets of almost all pension funds. 
7 The net pension replacement rates in Austria, Hungary, Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg, and the Slovak Republic are rather similar to those in the Nether- 
lands. 
8 This is under the condition that workers work full-time and have no gaps in yearly contributions to the public sector’s pension fund. 
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 and gradual retirement schemes and different sets of ﬁnancial incentives. In total, 1760 working individuals completed the
survey. 9 
3.2. Experimental design 
This stated preference experiment used vignettes in which individuals were confronted with various hypothetical, yet re-
alistic pension schemes. The stated preference experiment was introduced by a short text explaining the topic, after which
employees were assigned to six vignettes representing the pension scheme scenarios (involving either gradual or full re-
tirement), including different ﬁnancial incentives and containing a set of retirement ages and related income replacement
rates (expressed as a percentage of current net income). The way we present the pension schemes closely resembles the
way the pension fund reports actual replacement rates at retirement age to its clients, although the pension schemes in the
vignettes are simpliﬁed versions of the pension system, to keep the stated preference experiment comprehensible. For each
scenario, respondents were asked which retirement age and associated replacement rate they prefer, making it possible to
quantify how changes in ﬁnancial incentives affect gradual and full-time retirement age. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows
the introductory text and two examples of the vignettes. 
We designed a total of ten pension scheme scenarios with different retirement ages and replacement rate combinations.
Each respondent had to respond to two baseline scenarios: one that allows workers to retire only full-time and another
that allows workers to retire gradually. The replacement rates in both baseline scenarios closely match those applied to an
average public sector employee in the Netherlands at the time of the survey, with actuarially fair accruals of 5% for full-
time employment and 2.5% for part-time employment, and a 90% replacement rate upon retirement at age 68 for regular
retirement, and at age 70 for gradual retirement (see the discussion on the Dutch pension system in Section 2 ). 
The other eight scenarios differ from one another in terms of the incentives for continued employment provided by the
retirement scheme. We implement a price of leisure type of incentive (accruals of 7.5% or 10% for an additional year of
employment), and a pension income type of incentive (decreasing pension income at all ages by 5% or 10%). Four of these
pension scheme scenarios allow workers to choose their preferred age of full-time retirement, while the other scenarios
allow for gradual retirement with a speciﬁc number of years of part-time employment before full retirement. 10 Apart from
the baseline scenarios, two regular and two gradual retirement scenarios were randomly assigned to each respondent. Also,
the order in which the scenarios were presented to the respondents was randomised. 
Table 1 shows the ten pension scenarios with their combinations of retirement age and replacement rate. 11 Scenario 1
is the full-time baseline scenario. It offers a replacement rate of 90% of net wage if the individual chooses to retire at age
68. For each additional year of work, the replacement rate increases by 5 percentage points. Scenarios 2 and 3 increase the
price of leisure incentive. For each additional year of work, the replacement rate increases by 7.5 percentage points and
10 percentage points for Scenarios 2 and 3, respectively. However, in these two scenarios, the replacement rate remains
at the level of 90% of net wage if the individual chooses to retire at age 68. Scenarios 4 and 5 show the pension income
incentive. While the two scenarios keep the increase in the replacement rate for each additional year of work at the level
of 5 percentage points, they change the replacement rate at each year of retirement, regardless of age of retirement. In
Scenario 4, the replacement rate is 85% for retiring at age 68, while in Scenario 5 it is 80% for retiring at that age. 
Scenarios 6 to 10 introduce gradual retirement. In these scenarios, individual’s work 50% of the normal full-time work
schedule in the Netherlands and are retired for the other 50%. 12 The total net income received in gradual retirement is the
sum of the part-time wage and the part-time pension and equals the pension after full-time retirement. Scenario 6 is the
gradual retirement baseline scenario. It offers a replacement rate of 90% of the net wage if the individual chooses to work
part-time at age 66, and fully retires at age 70. For each additional year of work, the replacement rate increases by 2.5
percentage points. This is half of what the individual would have built up by continuing working full-time for an additional
year. This implies that in the case of the baseline scenario, a person who ﬁrst retires part-time at age 69 and thereafter
retires full-time at age 70 receives a replacement rate of only 97.5% at age 69. The replacement rate at age 69 for a part-
timer consists then of 50% wage and 47.5% pension income. Starting at age 70, this person continues to receive a pension
of 97.5% until death, implying less earnings than when he/she had chosen the full-retirement option at age 70 without
any preceding part-time retirement (a replacement rate of 100% in the full-time scenario). In line with the actual pension
system in the Netherlands, we thus incorporate both part-time and full-time retirement into our experiment in such a way
that people do not automatically get full beneﬁts. 9 To check the representativeness of our estimation sample, we use administrative data of the pension fund to compare basic characteristics of the em- 
ployees in the population sample with those in the estimation sample. We ﬁnd that there are no signiﬁcant differences in age, wage, sector of occupation, 
and number of contractual work hours of employees between the two samples. 
10 For gradual retirement in our scenarios, each additional year of gradual retirement is counted as half a year in terms of accrual rates. 
11 Note that net replacement rates above 100% are realistic in the Netherlands. According to the OECD (2015) , the average net replacement rate in the 
Netherlands in 2015 was on average 96.7% for all workers and 101.3% for workers with low income during their working life because of the ﬁrst tier 
state pensions. In 2013, these percentages were even higher, with 101.1% on average for all workers and 104.8% for workers with low income. These high 
replacement rates are partly due to the fact that the retired pay lower income taxes than those employed. 
12 This corresponds roughly with the average number of hours workers intend to retire part-time in the public sector in real life, as reported in the ROA 
Public Sector Survey (2014). 
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Table 1 
Replacement rates in the retirement scenarios. 
Replacement rates in the scenarios 
Retirement age ∗ 1 2 3 4 5 
Baseline Price of leisure incentive Pension wealth incentive 
Regular 
retirement 
Accruals: 5%; 
replacement rate: 
90% at 68 
Accruals 7.5%; 
replacement rate: 
90% at 68 
Accruals 10%; 
replacement rate: 
90% at 68 
Accruals 5%; 
replacement rate: 
85% at 68 
Accruals 5%; 
replacement rate: 
80% at 68 
62 60 45 30 55 50 
63 65 52.5 40 60 55 
64 70 60 50 65 60 
65 75 67.5 60 70 65 
66 80 75 70 75 70 
67 85 82.5 80 80 75 
68 90 90 90 85 80 
69 95 97.5 100 90 85 
70 100 105 110 95 90 
6 7 8 9 10 
Baseline Price of leisure incentive Pension wealth incentive 
Gradual 
retirement 
Accruals: 5%; 
replacement rate: 
90% at 68 
Accruals 7.5%; 
replacement rate: 
90% at 68 
Accruals 10%; 
replacement rate: 
90% at 68 
Accruals 5%; 
replacement rate: 
85% at 68 
Accruals 5%; 
replacement rate: 
80% at 68 
62–63 62.5 48.75 35 57.2 52.5 
62–64 65 52.5 40 60 55 
63–64 67.5 56.25 45 62.5 57.5 
63–65 70 60 50 65 60 
62–67 72.5 63.75 55 67.5 62.5 
64–65 72.5 63.75 55 67.5 62.5 
63–67 75 67.5 60 70 65 
64–66 75 67.5 60 70 65 
66–67 77.5 71.25 65 72.5 67.5 
65–66 77.5 71.25 65 72.5 67.5 
62–70 80 75 70 75 70 
65–67 80 75 70 75 70 
63–70 82.5 78.75 75 77.5 72.5 
66–67 82.5 78.75 75 77.5 72.5 
65–69 85 82.5 80 80 75 
66–68 85 82.5 80 80 75 
66–69 87.5 86.25 85 82.5 77.5 
67–68 87.5 86.25 85 82.5 77.5 
66–70 90 90 90 85 80 
67–70 92.5 93.75 95 87.5 82.5 
68–70 95 97.5 100 90 85 
69–70 97.5 101.25 105 92.5 87.5 
∗ Note: Under gradual retirement scenarios, the ﬁrst age is the age of starting work on a part-time (gradual) basis, and the second age is the age of full 
retirement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Scenarios 7 and 8 increase the price of leisure incentive. For each full-time-equivalent year of work, the replacement rate
increases by 7.5 percentage points and 10 percentage points in Scenarios 7 and 8, respectively (3.75 percentage points and 5
percentage points, for each additional year of gradual retirement, respectively). The replacement rate is 90% of the net wage
if the individual chooses to work part-time at age 66, and fully retires at age 70. Scenarios 9 and 10 keep the increase in
replacement rate for each additional year of full-time-equivalent work at the level of 5 percentage points, but decrease the
replacement rate regardless of age of retirement. In Scenario 9, the replacement rate is 85% (80% in Scenario 10) when an
individual gradually retires at age 66 and fully retires at age 70. 
Finally, after the stated preferences experiment, respondents were asked to rank their choices on (part-time or full-time)
retirement ages and replacement rates in the various scenarios from most preferred (coded 6) to least preferred (coded 1). 13 13 We do not ﬁnd evidence that respondents had diﬃculties in making decisions in the different scenarios. Non-response on the vignettes was low: only 
36 respondents did not make a decision. Moreover, respondents answered the survey question which asked them to rank their previous answers to the 
vignettes in a consistent way. Table 7 shows that they generally prefer the answer they gave in the vignette which contains the most generous retirement 
scheme. The main reason that most respondents seem to understand the vignettes is that we present retirement schemes in a similar way as actual 
retirement schemes are presented in brochures from the public sector pension fund, unions, and employers when pension reforms were enacted in the 
past decade. Much of the past communication involved presenting speciﬁc retirement ages in combination with accompanying pension replacement rates. 
Recent communication tools allow for more ﬂexible ways of checking which pension income employees will receive when retiring at speciﬁc ages. 
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Table 2 
Background characteristics. 
Characteristic Average Standard deviation 
Age 56.12 5.70 
Gender (1 if male) 0.62 0.48 
Married 0.82 0.39 
High educated 0.72 0.44 
Intermediate educated 0.24 0.43 
Low educated 0.04 0.20 
Log monthly wage 7.73 0.54 
Full-time job 0.79 0.41 
Partner with income 0.71 0.45 
Partner with work 0.57 0.50 
Self-assessed health (on a scale from 1 to 5) 2.06 0.75 
Physically demanding jobs (on a scale from 0 to 10) 2.02 2.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows summary statistics of respondents’ main background characteristics. This table shows that the majority
of respondents in our analysis are male, highly educated, full-time employees with an average age of 56. The proportion
of highly educated public sector workers in our sample is consistent with that in other representative data sets, such as
the Dutch Labour Supply Panel and the Dutch Labour Force Survey . To check the randomisation of the scenarios in the stated
preferences experiment, we also separately analyse the summary statistics for all 10 retirement scenarios. We found no
statistically signiﬁcant differences in background characteristics across the scenarios (see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
3.4. Empirical approach 
The effect of gradual retirement on the total labour supply of our respondents is a net effect of the hours worked during
gradual retirement, the age of gradual retirement, and the duration of gradual retirement. The main question is whether
gradual retirement postpones full retirement enough to offset the negative effect on the number of hours worked of having
an earlier start to the retirement process in the years of gradual retirement before full retirement. We estimate OLS models
in which we regress the preferred age of full retirement, the ﬁrst observed preferred retirement age (including full-time
as well as part-time retirement) and the full-time-equivalent age of retirement (measuring total labour supply at the end
of a worker’s career) on the characteristics of the pension schemes in the stated preferences experiment. By so doing, we
identify to what extent the postponement of full-time retirement due to the introduction of gradual retirement is cancelled
out by a potential decrease in the date of the start of the retirement process and a reduction in working hours in the years
preceding full retirement. 
The characteristics of the pension schemes include a dummy variable indicating whether the scenario includes gradual
retirement, the two variables indicating which ﬁnancial incentives are given in the scenario, and which randomisation order
of the scenarios is applied. Because each individual in the data set reported a retirement age under six different retirement
scenarios, we use a clustered sandwich estimator to allow for intragroup correlation at the individual level ( Rogers 1993;
Wooldridge 2002 ). 
The full-time retirement age measures when workers retire full-time, irrespective of whether workers had the opportu-
nity to gradually retire before this age. The ﬁrst observed preferred retirement age is a dummy measuring whether workers
take up any form of retirement. When individuals retire full-time, this age is identical to the full-time retirement age; in
case of part-time retirement, it will be lower than the full-time retirement age. This variable thus measures the number of
months workers would move the start of the retirement process forward if they had the gradual retirement option. Finally,
the full-time equivalent age of retirement takes into account the period in which workers were part-time retired until full-
time retirement and measures the net effect on labour supply. Because part-time retirement in our scenarios means that
individuals work 50% of the time and are retired for the other 50%, the full-time equivalent age of retirement increases by
only 6 months with every additional year that individuals are part-time retired. In the case of a full-time pension scheme,
an increase in the chosen age of retirement equals the increase in the full-time-equivalent age of retirement. 
The main explanatory variable in the OLS estimations is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the retirement
scenario includes gradual retirement (Scenarios 6–9), and 0 otherwise. We further include two variables that measure the
price of leisure and pension income incentives. We measure the price of leisure incentive by a variable that takes the value
0 for Scenarios 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10 (5% accruals), the value 1 for Scenarios 2 and 7 (7.5% accruals), and the value 2 for
Scenarios 3 and 8 (10% accruals). Thus, a one-point increase on this scale represents the effect of a 2.5-percentage-point
increase in the price of leisure. We measure the pension income incentive by a variable that takes the value 0 for Scenarios
1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 (90% replacement rate), the value 1 for Scenarios 4 and 9 (85% replacement rate), and the value 2 for
Scenarios 5 and 10 (80% replacement rate). Therefore, a one-point increase on this scale represents a ﬁve-percentage-point
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Table 3 
Retirement scenarios, retirement age, and full-time-equivalent age of retirement. 
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 
Baseline Price of leisure incentive Pension wealth incentive 
Regular retirement Accruals: 5%; 
replacement rate: 90% 
at 68 
Accruals 7.5%; 
replacement rate: 90% 
at 68 
Accruals 10%; 
replacement rate: 90% 
at 68 
Accruals 5%; 
replacement rate: 85% 
at 68 
Accruals 5%; 
replacement rate: 80% 
at 68 
Retirement age 64.97 
(1.80) 
65.84 
(1.56) 
66.05 
(1.36) 
65.40 
(1.72) 
65.99 
(1.77) 
Full-time-equivalent 
age of retirement 
64.97 
(1.80) 
65.84 
(1.56) 
66.05 
(1.36) 
65.40 
(1.72) 
65.99 
(1.77) 
Scenario 6 7 8 9 10 
Baseline Price of leisure incentive Pension wealth incentive 
Gradual retirement Accruals: 5%; 
replacement rate: 90% 
at 68 
Accruals 7.5%; 
replacement rate: 90% 
at 68 
Accruals 10%; 
replacement rate: 90% 
at 68 
Accruals 5%; 
replacement rate: 85% 
at 68 
Accruals 5%; 
replacement rate: 80% 
at 68 
Retirement age 65.95 
(1.83) 
66.65 
(1.76) 
67.18 
(1.73) 
66.34 
(1.75) 
66.88 
(1.92) 
Full-time-equivalent 
age of retirement 
64.77 
(1.47) 
65.36 
(1.38) 
65.79 
(1.27) 
65.10 
(1.44) 
65.59 
(1.56) 
Note: In the case of a full-time pension scheme, the increase in the preferred age of retirement is equal to the increase in the full-time-equivalent retirement 
age. Because employees who gradually retire are deﬁned as working 50% of a full-time job in the vignettes, an increase in the preferred part-time retirement 
age by 1 year increases the full-time equivalent retirement age by only 6 months. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 decrease in pension income. Further, we include dummy variables in our models to control for the randomisation order of
the scenarios. 14 
Furthermore, we estimate a multinomial logit regression on the preferred full-time retirement age, which allows us to
check for nonlinearities in the impact of gradual retirement on early and late full-time retirement. For our analyses on
how respondents ranked their choices on (part-time or full-time) retirement ages and replacement rates in the various
scenarios, we use a rank-ordered logit. The rank-ordered logit model is speciﬁcally designed to deal with ranked data in
which decision makers combine attributes of alternatives into overall evaluations of the attractiveness of these alternatives.
The ranked ordered logit model is a generalization of a version of McFadden’s choice model without alternative-speciﬁc
covariates. It explicitly takes into account that the rank of an individual choice depends on the ranking of the other choices.
4. Gradual retirement, retirement age, and labour supply 
4.1. Retirement choices 
Fig. 1 shows the distribution of full retirement choices across the retirement scenarios. The ﬁgure clearly shows that
gradual retirement scenarios shift upwards the age at which workers fully retire. While the retirement age that is most
often chosen in the full-time retirement scenarios ranges from 65 to 66, respondents most often choose age 67 for full
retirement in gradual retirement scenarios. Age 65 corresponds to the former AOW eligibility age in the Netherlands, while
ages 66 and 67 correspond to the higher eligibility ages as of 2018 and 2021, respectively. The ﬁgure further shows that the
preferred full-time retirement age is responsive to ﬁnancial incentives, and that at each level of ﬁnancial incentive, the full-
time retirement age is slightly higher in gradual retirement scenarios than in full-time retirement scenarios. Most strikingly,
the gradual retirement option in combination with strong ﬁnancial incentives to postpone retirement induces 17.5% of our
sample to continue working until age 70. 
Table 3 summarises average full-time retirement age and full-time-equivalent age of retirement under each retirement
scenario. This table shows that under the full-time retirement scenarios, the average retirement age (and full-time-equivalent
age of retirement) in the baseline scenario is 64.97 years. The average retirement age increases to 65.84 when the price of
leisure incentive increases from 5 percentage points to 7.5 percentage points (Scenario 2), and additionally slightly increases
to 66.05 when the price of leisure incentive goes from 7.5 percentage points to 10 percentage points (Scenario 3). A 5-
percentage-point decrease in pension income (Scenario 4) increases the age of retirement to 65.40. A further decrease in
pension income by 5 percentage points increases the average age of retirement to almost 66 years (Scenario 5). 
This table further conﬁrms that average full-time expected retirement ages are higher under gradual retirement scenarios
than under full-time retirement scenarios with the same price of leisure or pension income incentives. However, the results
change considerably when we examine the average full-time-equivalent retirement age. In the baseline scenario for gradual14 These dummies are never statistically signiﬁcant. 
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Fig. 1. Distribution of chosen full-retirement ages. 
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Table 4 
Retirement scenarios and duration of part-time retirement. 
Duration of part-time retirement Average Standard deviation 
Scenario 6 Base scenario: accruals: 5%; replacement rate: 90% at 68 2.37 1.51 
Scenario 7 Price of leisure incentive: accruals 7.5%; replacement rate: 90% at 68 2.57 1.76 
Scenario 8 Price of leisure incentive: accruals 10%; replacement rate: 90% at 68 2.77 2.09 
Scenario 9 Pension wealth incentive: accruals 5%; replacement rate: 85% at 68 2.46 1.50 
Scenario 10 Pension wealth incentive: accruals 5%; replacement rate: 80% at 68 2.58 1.85 
Table 5 
Relationship between gradual retirement, full-time retirement age, ﬁrst observed and full-time-equivalent age of retirement. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Full-time retirement age First observed retirement age 
(full-time or part-time) 
Full-time-equivalent age of retirement 
Gradual retirement 0.977 ∗∗∗
(0.024) 
0.976 ∗∗∗
(0.024) 
0.964 ∗∗∗
(0.029) 
−1.551 ∗∗∗
(0.023) 
−1.552 ∗∗∗
(0.023) 
−1.411 ∗∗∗
(0.029) 
−0.287 ∗∗∗
(0.017) 
−0.288 ∗∗∗
(0.017) 
−0.224 ∗∗∗
(0.023) 
Price of leisure incentive 0.601 ∗∗∗
(0.017) 
0.591 ∗∗∗
(0.017) 
0.490 ∗∗∗
(0.014) 
0.580 ∗∗∗
(0.017) 
0.545 ∗∗∗
(0.013) 
0.585 ∗∗∗
(0.016) 
Gradual retirement ∗Price of 
leisure incentive 
0.021 
(0.026) 
−0.180 ∗∗∗
(0.023) 
−0.079 ∗∗∗
(0.017) 
Pension income incentive 0.464 ∗∗∗
(0.015) 
0.462 ∗∗∗
(0.015) 
0.424 ∗∗∗
(0.013) 
0.472 ∗∗∗
(0.016) 
0.4 4 4 ∗∗∗
(0.012) 
0.467 ∗∗∗
(0.015) 
Gradual retirement ∗Pension 
income incentive 
0.004 
(0.024) 
−0.097 ∗∗∗
(0.022) 
−0.047 ∗∗∗
(0.017) 
Constant 65.695 ∗∗∗
(0.097) 
65.094 ∗∗∗
(0.101) 
65.101 ∗∗∗
(0.101) 
65.690 ∗∗∗
(0.092) 
65.200 ∗∗∗
(0.094) 
65.129 ∗∗∗
(0.095) 
65.692 ∗∗∗
(0.092) 
65.147 ∗∗∗
(0.095) 
65.115 ∗∗∗
(0.096) 
Observations 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560 
R-squared 0.072 0.128 0.128 0.191 0.233 0.234 0.016 0.079 0.080 
Note: Full-time-equivalent age of retirement is estimated to be six months for each additional year of (part-time) employment/retirement. Dummies for 
randomisation of scenarios included as controls. OLS estimates including robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the individual level are in 
parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 retirement (Scenario 6), the average retirement age is 65.95, which is almost 1 year later than in the full-time baseline sce-
nario (Scenario 1). The average full-time-equivalent retirement age is, however, only 64.77, which is less than the average
full-time retirement age in baseline Scenario 1. When the price of leisure incentive increases to 7.5% and 10% in the gradual
retirement scenarios (Scenarios 7 and 8), average retirement age increases to 66.65 and 67.18, respectively. The correspond-
ing average full-time-equivalent retirement age increases only to 65.36 and 65.79, respectively. This implies that the average
full-time-equivalent retirement age in these two scenarios is lower than the average full-time-equivalent retirement age in
full-time retirement Scenarios 2 and 3. Similarly, decreasing pension income to 85% and 80% in gradual retirement Scenarios
9 and 10 increases average retirement age to 6 6.34 and 6 6.68, and increases average full-time-equivalent retirement age to
65.10 and 65.59, respectively. The average full-time-equivalent age in these two scenarios is again lower than in Scenarios 4
and 5. The results presented in Table 3 therefore suggest that, although gradual retirement increases the retirement age, its
impact on workers’ labour supply is negative. Moreover, the table shows that ﬁnancial incentives to postpone retirement, ir-
respective of whether they generate price of leisure or income shocks, increase both the expected retirement age and labour
supply. 
Fig. 2 sheds more light on the distribution of the duration of the period in which workers are part-time retired. For the
baseline gradual retirement scenario, we observe that most workers choose a relatively short duration of part-time retire-
ment: 73.6% of respondents choose to work only 1 or 2 years part-time before they fully retire. This short duration suggests
that most workers consider part-time retirement as a sort of short-term bridge job between full-time employment and
full-time retirement, allowing them to gradually withdraw from the labour market. The ﬁgure also shows a small peak in
the distribution at the part-time retirement duration of 4 years and further indicates that only a small minority of work-
ers (8.9%) wishes to retire part-time for more than 5 years. Further, it is clear that introduction of ﬁnancial incentives to
continue working slightly increases the duration of the period in which workers are part-time retired. This is conﬁrmed
by Table 4 , which presents the average part-time retirement duration for each scenario. Duration of part-time retirement
increases from 2 years and 4 months in the baseline scenario to 2 years and 9 months in the scenario in which the price of
leisure incentive increases to 10% (Scenario 8). A drop in pension income of 10% leads to a duration of part-time retirement
of 2 years and 7 months. 
4.2. Main regression analysis 
Table 5 shows OLS estimations of the effect of gradual retirement on expected full-time retirement age (Columns 1–3),
ﬁrst observed retirement age (Columns 4–6), and full-time-equivalent retirement age (Columns 7–9). Columns 1, 4, and
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Fig. 2. Distribution of chosen duration of part-time retirement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 show raw estimates that include only a dummy variable indicating whether the scenario includes gradual retirement.
Columns 2, 5, and 8 control for ﬁnancial incentives (i.e., price of leisure and pension income), and Columns 3, 6, and 9
include an interaction between gradual retirement and ﬁnancial incentives, to investigate the extent to which the impact of
gradual retirement schemes differs given the ﬁnancial incentives provided by the pension system to continue working. The
table shows that in gradual retirement systems, workers expect to fully retire about one year (11.7 months) later than in
full-time retirement systems. 
In the part-time scenarios, the ﬁrst observed retirement age is, however, on average 18.6 months earlier than in the full-
time scenarios. Gradual retirement thus postpones the date of complete retirement, but substantially brings forward the age
at which the retirement process starts by entering gradual retirement. When we consider the full-time equivalent retirement
age, we observe that in the gradual retirement scenarios workers’ labour supply is, on average, 3.4 months lower. The
replacement of full-time retirement schemes with gradual retirement schemes will therefore have negative consequences on
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 workers’ lifetime labour supply. This is because the positive effect of gradual retirement on labour supply in terms of number
of years in paid employment, as a consequence of the postponement of full-time retirement (an increase in labour supply
of 11.7 months x 0.5 = 5.9 months), is outweighed by the reduction in labour supply because of the drop in weekly working
hours due to the earlier start of the (gradual) retirement process: a decrease of 18.6 months x 0.5 = −9.3 months. Adding
these different im pacts on workers’ labour supply yields a total drop in labour supply of 3.4 months. Gradual retirement has
thus an asymmetric effect on the timing of various retirement stages by inducing an earlier start to the retirement process
and not postponing full-time retirement enough to generate an offsetting effect on hours worked. 
Table 5 further shows that a 2.5-percentage-point increase in accruals induces workers to postpone retirement by 7.2
months, and that a 5-percentage-point decrease in pension income increases the retirement age by 5.6 months. More im-
portantly, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant interaction effect between the ﬁnancial incentives and the part-time retirement indicator
on expected full-time retirement age. We do ﬁnd, however, a small statistically signiﬁcant negative interaction effect on
the full-time-equivalent age of retirement, suggesting that labour supply under gradual retirement scenarios is slightly less
responsive to changes in ﬁnancial incentives. 15 
Fig. 3 (a) and (b) show the marginal effects (relative to the full-retirement base Scenario 1) for each retirement scenario
on the probability of fully retiring at age 67 or older, at ages 65 and 66, or earlier (at ages 62–64). The marginal effects
are calculated based on the coeﬃcient estimates of a multinomial logit model (see Table A3 in the Appendix for the co-
eﬃcient estimates) that allows us to check for nonlinearities in the impact of gradual retirement on full-time retirement
expectations. 16 The ﬁgures show results that are largely consistent with the OLS estimates in Table 5 . Gradual retirement
substantially reduces the likelihood that workers wish to retire early (17 percentage points less likely to retire than in the
base scenario) or at ages 65 and 66 (7 percentage points less likely to retire). 17 The ﬁgures further show that especially
strong accrual rates in combination with gradual retirement are more likely to stimulate workers to retire late (at age 67
or later) compared to the base scenario. However, both interaction effects between the ﬁnancial incentives and our gradual
retirement indicator on the average expected full-time retirement age in Table 5 are not statistically signiﬁcant. This means
that introduction of gradual retirement stimulates later full-time retirement, irrespective of the ﬁnancial incentive structure.15 Approximately 80% of all workers in our estimation sample work full time, and about 20% work part-time. Because the stated preferences experiment 
presents a hypothetical situation in which workers work part-time, we checked to what extent workers with part-time and full-time jobs respond dif- 
ferently to the vignettes. Table A4 in Appendix A shows that our main results are robust to the part-time status of the respondents in our estimation 
sample. 
16 See also Van Soest et al. (2007) and Kantarci and Van Soest (2013) . 
17 This result is robust to different deﬁnitions of early and late retirement. 
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Table 6 
Testing for nonlinear effects of ﬁnancial incentives. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Full-time retirement 
age 
First observed retirement age 
(full-time or part-time) 
Full-time-equivalent 
age of retirement 
Gradual retirement 0.986 ∗∗∗
(0.030) 
−1.388 ∗∗∗
(0.029) 
−0.201 ∗∗∗
(0.024) 
Regular retirement: Price of leisure incentive 7.5% (baseline 
regular retirement scenario = ref.) 
0.841 ∗∗∗
(0.028) 
0.788 ∗∗∗
(0.028) 
0.815 ∗∗∗
(0.027) 
Regular retirement: Price of leisure incentive 10%% 1.119 ∗∗∗
(0.035) 
1.113 ∗∗∗
(0.034) 
1.116 ∗∗∗
(0.033) 
Regular retirement: Pension wealth incentive 5% 0.420 ∗∗∗
(0.026) 
0.469 ∗∗∗
(0.026) 
0.4 4 4 ∗∗∗
(0.025) 
Regular retirement: Pension wealth incentive 10% 0.986 ∗∗∗
(0.031) 
0.992 ∗∗∗
(0.032) 
0.989 ∗∗∗
(0.030) 
Gradual retirement: Price of leisure incentive 7.5% (baseline 
gradual retirement scenario = ref.) 
0.713 ∗∗∗
(0.042) 
0.460 ∗∗∗
(0.034) 
0.587 ∗∗∗
(0.025) 
Gradual retirement: Price of leisure incentive 10%% 1.207 ∗∗∗
(0.051) 
0.797 ∗∗∗
(0.040) 
1.002 ∗∗∗
(0.029) 
Gradual retirement: Pension wealth incentive 5% 0.428 ∗∗∗
(0.037) 
0.372 ∗∗∗
(0.030) 
0.400 ∗∗∗
(0.023) 
Gradual retirement: Pension wealth incentive 10% 0.948 ∗∗∗
(0.047) 
0.754 ∗∗∗
(0.037) 
0.851 ∗∗∗
(0.028) 
Constant 65.044 ∗∗∗
(0.101) 
65.081 ∗∗∗
(0.096) 
65.063 ∗∗∗
(0.096) 
Observations 10,560 10,560 10,560 
R-squared 0.129 0.235 0.081 
Note: Full-time-equivalent age of retirement is estimated to be six months for each additional year of (part-time) employment/retirement. Dummies for 
randomisation of scenarios included as controls. OLS estimates including robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the individual level are in 
parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1. 
 
 
 
 
 Apart from the nonlinearities in the impact of gradual retirement on retirement expectations, we should also examine
in more detail whether there are nonlinear effects from the ﬁnancial incentives provided by each scenario. 18 Table 6 tests
for nonlinear effects of each ﬁnancial incentive in the scenarios by replacing the categorical variables with dummy variables
indicating the scenario the respondents considered. The results show that the effects of the pension income incentives in
the vignettes are indeed linearly associated with full-time retirement age. This is not entirely the case for the price of leisure18 Until now, we have used categorical variables for the price of leisure and pension income incentives in our regressions. 
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Table 7 
Ranking of preferences for different retirement scenarios. 
Retirement scenario Average ranking Percentage most preferred scenario 
Full-time schemes 
Scenario 1 Base scenario: accruals: 5%; replacement rate: 90% at 68 5.13 57.4 
Scenario 2 Price of leisure incentive: accruals 7.5%; replacement rate: 90% at 68 3.83 5.0 
Scenario 3 Price of leisure incentive: accruals 10%; replacement rate: 90% at 68 2.85 2.2 
Scenario 4 Pension wealth incentive: accruals 5%; replacement rate: 85% at 68 3.80 2.4 
Scenario 5 Pension wealth incentive: accruals 5%; replacement rate: 80% at 68 2.54 0.9 
Gradual schemes 
Scenario 6 Base scenario: accruals: 5%; replacement rate: 90% at 68 4.39 26.2 
Scenario 7 Price of leisure incentive: accruals 7.5%; replacement rate: 90% at 68 3.06 2.6 
Scenario 8 Price of leisure incentive: accruals 10%; replacement rate: 90% at 68 1.95 1.0 
Scenario 9 Pension wealth incentive: accruals 5%; replacement rate: 85% at 68 3.06 1.3 
Scenario 10 Pension wealth incentive: accruals 5%; replacement rate: 80% at 68 1.85 1.1 
Note: In total, six scenarios were ranked by respondents. The most preferred scenario is attributed value 6, while the least preferred scenario 
is attributed value 1. Column 1 shows average ranking of the scenarios. Column 2 shows how many workers chose each scenario as their most 
preferred scenario. 
Table 8 
Ranking scenarios. 
OLS Rank-ordered logit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gradual retirement -0.764 ∗∗∗
(0.044) 
−0.764 ∗∗∗
(0.043) 
−0.732 ∗∗∗
(0.054) 
−0.528 ∗∗∗
(0.027) 
−0.729 ∗∗∗
(0.029) 
−0.728 ∗∗∗
(0.044) 
Price of leisure incentive −1.189 ∗∗∗
(0.024) 
−1.150 ∗∗∗
(0.031) 
−0.953 ∗∗∗
(0.024) 
−0.949 ∗∗∗
(0.031) 
Gradual retirement ∗Price of leisure 
incentive 
−0.077 ∗∗
(0.037) 
−0.010 
(0.040) 
Pension income incentive −1.273 ∗∗∗
(0.021) 
−1.280 ∗∗∗
(0.028) 
−1.056 ∗∗∗
(0.025) 
−1.060 ∗∗∗
(0.031) 
Gradual retirement ∗Pension income 
incentive 
0.015 
(0.038) 
0.009 
(0.041) 
Constant 3.881 ∗∗∗
(0.022) 
5.112 ∗∗∗
(0.028) 
5.096 ∗∗∗
(0.033) 
Observations 8897 8897 8897 8897 8897 8897 
R-squared 0.050 0.397 0.397 
Note: In total, six scenarios were ranked by respondents. The most preferred scenario is attributed value 6, while the least preferred scenario is attributed 
value 1. Columns 1–3 show OLS estimates and Columns 4–6 show rank-ordered logit estimates. The estimates include robust standard errors corrected for 
clustering on the individual level, which are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 incentives in the full-time retirement scenarios, where we observe a concave relationship. We do, however, ﬁnd evidence
for a linear relation for both pension income and the price of leisure incentives in the gradual retirement scenarios. 
4.3. Ranking preferences for gradual and full-time retirement 
From a theoretical perspective, we would expect that gradual retirement schemes contribute to improving lifetime utility,
since they introduce the possibility of avoiding the shock of abrupt transition from full-time work to full-time retirement.
Gradual retirement may further reduce the burden of work, and thereby reduce work-related stress and increase employee
morale until full retirement ( Reday-Mulvey and Delsen 1996; Reday-Mulvey 20 0 0 ). 
To measure respondents’ preferences for gradual retirement over full retirement schemes, we asked respondents to rank
the choices they made in each of the six vignettes. The respondents could rank their choices from most preferred (coded 6)
to least preferred (coded 1). Column 1 of Table 7 shows the average ranking of each retirement scenario. This table shows
that the baseline full-time retirement scenario, which also includes the most generous ﬁnancial incentives, is most preferred
(average rank: 5.13), while the baseline gradual retirement scenario is less often preferred (average rank: 4.39). Comparing
the ranking of the other scenarios makes clear that none of the gradual retirement scenarios is, on average, preferred to the
full-time scenarios with equivalent ﬁnancial incentives. Column 2 of Table 7 further shows that 57% of all workers chose the
baseline full-time retirement scenario as their most preferred scenario, while only 26% chose the baseline gradual retirement
scenario as their most preferred scenario. 
Table 8 reports OLS and rank-ordered logit estimates on how the various attributes of the retirement scenarios relate
to the rank-order that respondents give to the scenarios. The rank-ordered logit takes into account that the rank of an
individual choice is interdependent on the ranking of the other choices. Table 8 conﬁrms that workers prefer full-time
retirement irrespective of whether OLS or a rank-ordered logit is used. Scenarios with higher prices for leisure or stronger
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Table 9 
Gradual retirement and full-time-equivalent age of retirement: the role of age. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Full-time retirement age First observed retirement age 
(full-time or part-time) 
Full-time-equivalent age of retirement 
VARIABLES Age < = 55 Age > 55 & 
Age < 60 
Age > = 60 Age < = 55 Age > 55 & 
Age < 60 
Age > = 60 Age < = 55 Age > 55 & 
Age < 60 
Age > = 60 
Gradual retirement 1.011 ∗∗∗
(0.052) 
0.967 ∗∗∗
(0.042) 
0.876 ∗∗∗
(0.066) 
−1.460 ∗∗∗
(0.055) 
−1.371 ∗∗∗
(0.041) 
−1.421 ∗∗∗
(0.058) 
−0.224 ∗∗∗
(0.044) 
−0.202 ∗∗∗
(0.032) 
−0.273 ∗∗∗
(0.049) 
Price of leisure incentive 0.644 ∗∗∗
(0.033) 
0.598 ∗∗∗
(0.024) 
0.484 ∗∗∗
(0.034) 
0.634 ∗∗∗
(0.033) 
0.586 ∗∗∗
(0.023) 
0.478 ∗∗∗
(0.032) 
0.639 ∗∗∗
(0.032) 
0.592 ∗∗∗
(0.023) 
0.481 ∗∗∗
(0.032) 
Gradual retirement ∗Price of 
leisure incentive 
−0.027 
(0.045) 
0.022 
(0.037) 
0.101 ∗
(0.057) 
−0.178 ∗∗∗
(0.042) 
−0.208 ∗∗∗
(0.032) 
−0.117 ∗∗
(0.048) 
−0.102 ∗∗∗
(0.031) 
−0.093 ∗∗∗
(0.024) 
−0.008 
(0.037) 
Pension income incentive 0.507 ∗∗∗
(0.029) 
0.458 ∗∗∗
(0.022) 
0.396 ∗∗∗
(0.029) 
0.517 ∗∗∗
(0.030) 
0.470 ∗∗∗
(0.023) 
0.402 ∗∗∗
(0.032) 
0.512 ∗∗∗
(0.028) 
0.464 ∗∗∗
(0.021) 
0.399 ∗∗∗
(0.029) 
Gradual retirement ∗Pension 
income incentive 
−0.002 
(0.043) 
−0.007 
(0.035) 
0.034 
(0.056) 
−0.124 ∗∗∗
(0.039) 
−0.107 ∗∗∗
(0.031) 
−0.023 
(0.047) 
−0.063 ∗∗
(0.031) 
−0.057 ∗∗
(0.024) 
0.005 
(0.038) 
Constant 65.226 ∗∗∗
(0.191) 
64.921 ∗∗∗
(0.156) 
65.269 ∗∗∗
(0.150) 
65.240 ∗∗∗
(0.183) 
64.998 ∗∗∗
(0.146) 
65.222 ∗∗∗
(0.142) 
65.233 ∗∗∗
(0.183) 
64.960 ∗∗∗
(0.147) 
65.245 ∗∗∗
(0.139) 
Observations 3552 4902 2106 3552 4902 2106 3552 4902 2106 
R-squared 0.132 0.127 0.168 0.229 0.234 0.294 0.089 0.080 0.116 
Note: OLS estimates, including robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the individual level, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 pension income incentives to postpone retirement are, as could be expected, ranked lower. Finally, the analysis including the
interactions between gradual retirement and the two ﬁnancial incentives shows that workers especially dislike the scenario
that includes a combination of gradual retirement and price of leisure incentives. This could be due to the fact that, in the
gradual retirement regime, workers already pay a higher price (in terms of lower replacement rates) for more leisure time. 
The results of our ranking analysis are thus not in line with our expectation that the introduction of gradual retire-
ment opportunities would lead to substantially different retirement patterns ( Reday-Mulvey and Delsen 1996; Reday-Mulvey
20 0 0 ). However, our results are consistent with other studies which showed that many workers are more likely to choose
full retirement over partial retirement (Van Soest et al. 2006; Kantarci and Van Soest 2013 ). 19 , 20 
4.4. Heterogeneity in preferences: the role of age 
In this subsection, we examine the effects of gradual retirement by subject age. Such analysis helps to assess the validity
of our results. Workers enrolled in the study were born between 1952 and 1975. As the experiment was conducted in 2016,
the age range of the workers in our sample was 41 to 64. The oldest respondents were thus very close to deciding whether
to retire, while the youngest workers still had to work for approximately 25 more years. We could therefore expect that
older workers have more precise preferences regarding their retirement than younger workers. 
Table 9 shows OLS regressions of the heterogeneous treatment effects by age group: workers who are 55 years or
younger, workers aged 56–59, and those aged 60 years or older. This table shows that the differences in the impact of
gradual retirement by age group are extremely small. We do ﬁnd that workers aged 60 years or older postpone their full-
time retirement by 1.6 months less when they have the gradual retirement option compared to workers who are 55 years
and younger. This effect is only marginally statistically signiﬁcant. However, we also observe that there is no signiﬁcant dif-
ference in the effect of gradual retirement on the overall labour supply between the age groups. Our results thus show that
Dutch middle age individuals are very forward looking, with similar thinking about their retirement as older individuals. 
4.5. Heterogeneity in preferences: The role of health and heavy physical work 
One of the most frequently mentioned arguments in the policy debate in favour of introduction of gradual retirement
is that reduction in work hours reduces the burden of work for employees with health problems. Moreover, it may reduce
the burden of work for those who are employed in physically demanding jobs for which the need for recovery is greater.19 We replicated our main analyses separately for the government sector, the education sector, and employees of privatized organizations (among others, 
major utility and transport companies) in our estimation sample. In total, 43% of all employees are employed in the education sector, 39% in the government 
sector, and 18% are employed in the privatized sector. Table A5 shows that the results are similar for the various sectors. This boosts conﬁdence in the 
relevance of our results for the private sector. 
20 Table A6 presents the results of regression analyses on retirement age and the full-time equivalent age of retirement, where we make a selection on 
the ﬁrst choice in the ranking analysis. By selecting exclusively on the ﬁrst choice in the ranking analysis, our results are likely to be more closely related 
to revealed preferences, as we can assume that people in real life are more likely to pick their most preferred choice. We ﬁnd that the impact of gradual 
retirement does not differ from our basic results. This implies that our results may be closely related to workers’ actual choices. Moreover, the fact that we 
do not ﬁnd signiﬁcantly different results provides additional suggestive evidence that participants in our survey consistently answered the vignettes, even 
when the presented scenarios did not include their preferred choice. 
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Table 10 
Gradual retirement: a heterogeneity analysis. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Full-time retirement age First observed retirement age 
(full-time or part-time) 
Full-time-equivalent age of 
retirement 
Gradual retirement 0.849 ∗∗∗ 0.951 ∗∗∗ 0.828 ∗∗∗ −1.600 ∗∗∗ −1.565 ∗∗∗ −1.614 ∗∗∗ −0.375 ∗∗∗ −0.307 ∗∗∗ −0.393 ∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.027) (0.060) (0.057) (0.027) (0.058) (0.047) (0.020) (0.048) 
Price of leisure incentive 0.589 ∗∗∗ 0.617 ∗∗∗ 0.602 ∗∗∗ 0.517 ∗∗∗ 0.503 ∗∗∗ 0.528 ∗∗∗ 0.553 ∗∗∗ 0.560 ∗∗∗ 0.565 ∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.020) (0.045) (0.039) (0.017) (0.040) (0.037) (0.016) (0.038) 
Pension income incentive 0.431 ∗∗∗ 0.476 ∗∗∗ 0.446 ∗∗∗ 0.406 ∗∗∗ 0.427 ∗∗∗ 0.413 ∗∗∗ 0.419 ∗∗∗ 0.452 ∗∗∗ 0.429 ∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.020) (0.053) (0.048) (0.017) (0.050) (0.047) (0.016) (0.048) 
Bad health −0.322 ∗∗∗ −0.340 ∗∗∗ −0.292 ∗∗∗ −0.308 ∗∗∗ −0.307 ∗∗∗ −0.324 ∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.117) (0.110) (0.110) (0.112) (0.112) 
Gradual retirement ∗bad health 0.159 ∗∗ 0.156 ∗∗ 0.059 0.060 0.109 ∗∗ 0.108 ∗∗
(0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.065) (0.053) (0.054) 
Price of leisure incentive ∗bad health 0.011 0.019 −0.037 −0.031 −0.013 −0.006 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) 
Pension income incentive ∗bad health 0.042 0.040 0.023 0.019 0.032 0.030 
(0.061) (0.061) (0.057) (0.057) (0.055) (0.056) 
Physically demanding tasks 0.024 0.042 0.004 0.021 0.014 0.032 
(0.102) (0.102) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.098) 
Gradual retirement ∗physically 
demanding tasks 
0.109 ∗ 0.106 0.046 0.046 0.078 0.076 
(0.066) (0.065) (0.060) (0.060) (0.051) (0.051) 
Price of leisure incentive ∗physically 
demanding tasks 
−0.062 −0.075 −0.055 −0.067 −0.059 −0.071 
(0.053) (0.052) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) 
Pension income incentive ∗physically 
demanding tasks 
−0.045 −0.052 −0.012 −0.016 −0.029 −0.034 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) 
Constant 65.348 ∗∗∗ 65.087 ∗∗∗ 65.350 ∗∗∗ 65.429 ∗∗∗ 65.201 ∗∗∗ 65.438 ∗∗∗ 65.388 ∗∗∗ 65.144 ∗∗∗ 65.394 ∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.104) (0.142) (0.131) (0.097) (0.132) (0.133) (0.098) (0.135) 
Observations 10,542 10,518 10,500 10,542 10,518 10,500 10,542 10,518 10,500 
R-squared 0.130 0.129 0.132 0.238 0.234 0.239 0.083 0.080 0.085 
Note: OLS estimates, including robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the individual level, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Gradual retirement schemes may therefore have an important positive impact on the total lifetime labour supply of these
particular groups of employees, as they may permit employees with health problems or who have physically demanding
jobs to keep working beyond an age at which they would otherwise have fully retired. 
We here analyse the extent to which introduction of gradual retirement opportunities affects differently the retirement
age and the full-time equivalent retirement age of employees who are in bad health and who work in physically demanding
jobs. Our health indicator is based on the following survey question: In general, how would you describe your current health?
Response categories ranged from 1 (very good) to 5 (bad). A worker is deﬁned to be in bad health if that worker’s score
is above the median score. Whether individuals work in a physically demanding job is measured by the following survey
question: 
How often do you spend time on the following task in your job? You can give your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0
means ‘never’ and 10 means ‘always’: 
Physically demanding tasks (such as the lifting of patients or heavy objects or operating machinery) 
Again, a worker is deﬁned to be working in a physically demanding job when that worker has a score above the median.
Table 10 shows the OLS regressions of the heterogeneous treatment effects on workers’ full-time retirement age, the ﬁrst
observed retirement age, and the full-time-equivalent retirement age. It becomes clear from Columns 1–3 that employees in
bad health who gain access to gradual retirement postpone full-time retirement by 11.6 months, while employees in good
health postpone full-time retirement by only 9.9 months. However, workers in bad health do not enter into gradual retire-
ment earlier than workers in good health (Columns 4–6). These results thus suggest that introduction of gradual retirement
indeed may reduce to some extent health-related burdens that employees with health problems may experience in carrying
out their jobs. Nevertheless, introduction of gradual retirement still reduces total labour supply of both groups of workers.
Columns 7–9 show that the full-time-equivalent retirement age among employees in bad health decreases by 3.4 months
when they gain access to gradual retirement, while it decreases by 4.7 months among those in good health. The table fur-
ther shows that workers in physically demanding jobs do retire somewhat later when they get the option to gradually retire,
but this effect is not robust to the inclusion of health indicators in the estimation. 
5. Conclusion 
We use data from a stated preferences experiment to study the extent to which gradual retirement affects workers’ re-
tirement full-time age, the start date of their retirement process, and their labour supply. Some studies suggest that gradual
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 retirement may not lead to a net increase in total labour supply (e.g., Gielen 2009; Machado and Portela 2012 ). However,
these studies focus on actual retirement decisions and therefore do not identify all retirement options available to older
workers, because the options that are not chosen cannot be observed, or because it is not clear which options could have
been chosen by workers ( Kantarci and Van Soest 2008, 2013 ). A stated preferences approach solves this problem by cap-
turing a broader array of preference-driven behaviours, and can therefore be used to estimate the causal relation between
gradual retirement and a worker’s age of retirement and labour supply. Concerns may arise about the external validity of re-
tirement options in stated preference studies, especially if these retirement options do not yet exist in practice ( Kantarci and
Van Soest, 2013 ). 21 However, the literature shows that stated preference estimates and estimates based on data on actual
behaviour are usually quite close ( Louviere et al., 20 0 0 ). 
We ﬁnd that gradual retirement schemes, compared to full-retirement schemes, induce workers to retire approximately
one year later. Lifetime labour supply of workers signiﬁcantly decreases in gradual retirement systems, as the positive effect
of postponing retirement on their labour supply is cancelled out by the reduction of working hours in the years before
full retirement. Gradual retirement thus has an asymmetric effect on the expected timing of various retirement stages by
inducing an early start to the retirement process and not postponing full-time retirement enough to generate an offsetting
effect on hours worked. In particular, for the oldest workers in our estimation sample, who are close to retirement, we
might expect that these expected labour supply effects would directly translate into actual labour supply effects. 
We further show that ﬁnancial incentives to postpone retirement (changes in the accrual rate in the pension scheme
and reductions in pension income) signiﬁcantly increase expected full-time retirement age. However, the impact of ﬁnancial
incentives on workers’ retirement expectations is similar across gradual and full-retirement options. There is, however, some
heterogeneity across workers in good and bad health. Employees in bad health who gain access to gradual retirement post-
pone their retirement age by 11.6 months, while employees in good health increase their retirement age by only 9.9 months.
This result suggests that introduction of gradual retirement alleviates, as is frequently suggested in the policy debate, some
of the health-related burden that employees with poor health may experience in carrying out their jobs. 
From a policy perspective, introduction of gradual retirement options could be welfare enhancing, as those who prefer
such an option would choose it, and those who do not would still have the option to fully retire. However, our ranking
analysis of the different pension scheme scenarios shows that a large majority of workers still prefers full retirement. More-
over, our results suggest that changing current retirement schemes into gradual retirement schemes would not contribute
to a further increase in labour supply. It is therefore important for policy makers to be clear on the main purpose behind
introducing gradual retirement schemes. When the main aim is to postpone full retirement, for example because staying
active to a later age enhances cognitive functioning and decreases the occurrence of impairments common at older ages,
introduction of gradual retirement is a useful instrument. If increasing labour supply is the policy target, our results suggest
that gradual retirement is not a recommended policy option. 
It should be noted, however, that we identify only the effect on the labour supply of the workers in our experiment.
We cannot claim that the decrease in labour supply due to gradual retirement would result in an overall reduction of
employment in the economy. It could be that employees who decide to gradually retire are replaced by their employers.
Whether their replacement will be through part-time or full-time employees is an important question, and partially depends
on the nature of the labour market, its institutional design, and its ﬂexibility. What matters then is the elasticity of new
hiring with respect to gradual retirement, which is a rather underdeveloped topic in the literature. However, several studies
(e.g., Card and Lemieux, 2001; Fitzenberger and Kohn, 2006; Gruber and Wise, 2010; Eichhorst et al., 2014; Montizaan, 2017 )
which focused on whether employment of older persons reduces the opportunities for employment of the young and vice
versa, ﬁnd no evidence that reducing/increasing the employment of older persons leads to more/less job opportunities for
younger persons on the macro level. Moreover, the literature on work-sharing shows that a reduction of work hours due
to work-sharing does not signiﬁcantly promote employment (e.g. Kapteyn et al., 2004; Skuterud, 2007 ). Based on the low
elasticities found in these studies, we therefore might expect that there is also an imperfect elasticity between the labour
supply of workers in our ‘close to retirement cohort’ who start to work part-time and the job opportunities of new hires.
We do concur, however, that there is not yet any research on this speciﬁc topic. 
We expect that our results may be of interest for countries with retirement systems and institutional contexts similar to
the Netherlands. Our results are most generalizable to Northern European countries, which have similar retirement systems,
rather similar net replacement rates, and average retirement ages which closely match the Dutch situation. Generalizability
will, however, be less for developing countries, the UK, and the United States, which have deﬁned contribution schemes and
considerably lower replacement rates. 
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